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Abstract
The construction industry faces a lack of compliance with policy that in Uganda public road 
construction projects affects the attainment of Government goals and disrupts infrastructure 
project delivery. For decades, public entities have been known for a lack of compliance that 
manifest in: poor performance, poor personnel management, poor resource utilization and 
unprofessionalism. In Uganda, this has resulted in several restructures aimed at improving 
service delivery. Despite this, compliance remains an issue. The purpose of this study is to 
establish factors affecting compliance within a public procurement regulatory framework 
in public road construction projects and foster economic development. A cross-sectional 
research design including a structured self-administered questionnaire survey and PLS-
SEM data analysis by SmartPLS3 was conducted. The research reveals that three factors 
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positively affect compliance with a regulatory framework that govern public road construction 
projects; sanctions on staff, inefficiency of the public procurement regulatory framework 
and contractors’ resistance to non-compliance. While a further three factors have little 
positive effect on compliance; familiarity, monitoring activities and professionalism. Hence, 
the research contributes to construction management by showing that sanctions, perceived 
inefficiency and contractors’ resistance significantly enhance compliance within a public 
procurement regulatory framework.
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Introduction
Public procurement is a contractual arrangement between Government and the private 
sector to deliver infrastructure, goods and services (Frøystad, Heggstad and Fjeldstad, 2010). 
Most Government’s rely on public procurement as a macroeconomic tool for economic 
development (Davis et al., 2016). For public procurement to achieve economic development, 
effective and efficient management of procurement activities is paramount (Obicci, 2015). 
Indeed, public funded procurement is measured against complex and long-term criteria that 
includes: economic benefit, accountability, transparency and non-discrimination regulation to 
protect public interests (Basheka and Bisangabasaija, 2010). This is unlike private procurement 
(Odhiambo and Kamau, 2003). For decades, public entities in Uganda have been known 
for poor procurement performance. This poor performance has been attributed to a lack of 
compliance with their public procurement regulatory frameworks and as a consequence the 
Government of Uganda has initiated restructuring processes and suggested recommendations 
to improve service delivery (Kakwezi and Nyeko, 2010).
Compliance refers to pursuing Government objectives through appropriate regulatory 
frameworks (Lisa, 2010; Windapo, 2013). In the context of this research, compliance with 
public procurement regulatory frameworks means staff implementing public road construction 
projects adhere to the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act (PPDA Act) 
2003. Interestingly, transparency and a clear regulatory framework in public road construction 
projects improves professionalism in contract execution (Ward et al., 2007). Conversely, a 
lack of compliance for example, poor administration leads to project failures in various guises 
(White and Fortune, 2002). Whereas a few studies attempted to address a lack of compliance 
in public procurement, surprisingly, less attention was paid to determine factors affecting 
compliance in an economically dependable road construction subsector (Amann et al., 2016). 
The study aims to bridge this research gap by determining compliance factors with particular 
emphasis on Uganda’s road subsector. To address this problem, the study adopted a literature 
review approach widely applied to identify factors across research fields (Bruton, Ahlstrom 
and Li, 2010; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Fayezi, O’Loughlin and Zutshi, 2012).The balance 
of this research is organized as follows; literature review, methodology, results, discussion and 
conclusion. 
Literature Review 
A comprehensive literature review was carried utilising appropriate key words in the domain 
of public procurement, regulatory compliance and construction projects. Published research 
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in peer-reviewed journals were retrieved from databases that included; Scopus, Google 
Scholar, Science direct search engines. The literature search produced over 700 journal 
articles and public reports from a period of 1987 to 2018. In this process, common factors 
affecting compliance in different fields were identified including; familiarity, monitoring, 
professionalism, sanctions, perceived inefficiency and contractors’ resistance (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 2015; Gelderman, Ghijsen and Schoonen, 2010; Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013; Tabish 
and Jha, 2015). Noteworthy, the literature review identified few studies that investigated 
compliance in public procurement without a focus on road construction projects. Public 
procurement regulatory frameworks aim at promoting fairness, transparency, accountability 
and value for money with efficient and effective procedures benefiting all stakeholders 
(Agaba and Shipman, 2007; Davis et al., 2016; PPDA Authority, 2003). However, enforcing 
compliance with public procurement regulatory framework is challenging (PPDA Authority, 
2016). Promoting compliance, needs to establish the root cause of noncompliance in 
procurement contracts. For example, procurement outside contractual agreements costed 
GlaxoSmithKline between US$80 to120 million (Kulp et al., 2006). Relatedly, increased 
accidents in the construction sector are attributed to lack of compliance with safety measures 
(Melzner et al., 2013). A lack of compliance is caused by; self-interest, weak enforcement 
mechanisms and inefficient regulatory frameworks, unprofessional behaviour among others. 
The outcome is failing to meet Government goals and project success (Mwakibinga and Buvik, 
2013). The following sections present specific details on the factors that affect compliance (See 
Table 1) and ends with respective hypotheses.
FAMILIARITY WITH REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Familiarity refers to knowledge of an entire regulatory framework, its process and procedures. 
Hunja (2003) suggests that despite academic qualifications, procurement officers lack 
knowledge in interpreting technical sections of public procurement documents. This is 
exacerbated by complex public road construction projects with numerous stakeholders and a 
myriad of interconnected policies. Consequently, procurement personnel require orientation 
on emerging issues that on some occasions would require concomitant attitudinal change 
(Chi and Nicole Javernick‐Will, 2011; Kaluarachchi and Jones, 2007). Accordingly, familiarity 
with regulatory frameworks governing road construction projects is important and action for 
improvement through industry education and training is required (DiMaggio and Powell, 
2015). Furthermore, an absence of familiarity with organizational structures and governance 
mechanism has caused capacity problems Hunja (2003) and in the case of Bangladesh, it has 
eventuated in the country failing to meet public procurement goals (Mahmood, 2010).
Similarly, in Uganda National Roads Authority’s (UNRA) end of 2013/2014 performance 
workshop, a lack of familiarity with the roads management system was raised as hampering 
compliance with their objectives (Uganda National Road Authority, 2014). This notion is 
supported by reports identifying that familiarity with rules increases compliance with formal 
documentary elements (Gelderman, Ghijsen and Brugman, 2006; McNutt and Rossi, 2010). 
To conclude, three pertinent examples are offered; the Netherland’s municipalities experienced 
non-compliance with procurement procedures due to a lack of familiarity with procurement 
process itself (de Boer and Telgen, 1998). Similarly, in Nigeria’s public construction sector, 
misconceptions and a lack of familiarity with procurement policies significantly affected 
compliance (Zadawa, Hussin and Osmadi, 2015) and finally reports showed a lack of 
familiarity with regulatory framework significantly affected compliance with Procurement Act 
in Kenya’s public secondary schools’ sector (Migosi et al., 2013). 
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MONITORING ACTIVITIES 
Monitoring activities is an organizational governance mechanism that ensures staff meet goals. 
Forsythe (2015); Isaac and Navon (2014) observed that continuous monitoring of construction 
projects improves productivity by taking corrective actions that promote compliance in 
procurement systems (Basheka, Oluka and Mugurusi, 2012). Considering an agency theory 
perspective, monitoring road construction projects is equally essential in enforcing compliance 
and meeting Government goals (Van Slyke, 2007).  This is inevitable for public road 
implementation because constant monitoring of staff compels them to discount unethical 
interest to pursue organizational goals (DiMaggio and Powell, 2015). Despite such positive 
suggestions, Rutherford, Buchholtz and Brown (2007) revealed that monitoring alone does not 
influence agent behaviour that affects compliance with regulatory frameworks (Peprah, 2015). 
Interestingly, Kauppi and van Raaij (2015) discovered that monitoring does not influence 
agent actions in meeting principal’s goals and is an insignificant factor in implementing public 
construction projects (Tabish and Jha, 2015). Convincingly, reports show that strict monitoring 
ensured compliance in construction and rehabilitation of nursing schools funded by European 
Union (Kakitahi, Landin and Alinaitwe, 2013). The same article attributes rework in Uganda’s 
public construction projects to inadequate supervision that required monitoring to improve 
contract performance (Oluka and Basheka, 2014). This suggests on-site project monitoring 
by different stakeholders is important to enhance compliance in construction projects (Deng 
et al., 2014) and requires compliance with regulatory frameworks (Sweis et  al., 2014). 
PROFESSIONALISM 
Professionalism refers to competence in skills, special knowledge with experience and 
membership of a professional body that exhibits an ethical code (Watson, 2002). Tombesi 
(2012) adds that professionalism arises from established ways of doing things, for example: 
architectural innovations and technical expertise. Consequently, project actors are focused 
on professionalism through professional bodies and code of conduct to ensure compliance 
in the construction industry (McCarthy, 2012; Sohail and Cavill, 2008). Accordingly, PPDA 
Authority (2016) suggests training and instilling ethical standards among procurement 
stakeholders to promote professionalism in public road construction projects and could be 
boosted through academic qualifications, skills and networking (DiMaggio and Powell, 2015). 
Despite such recommendations, professionalism insignificantly enhanced compliance in 
public procurement (Eyaa and Oluka, 2011). Further, more pertinent examples showed that 
lack of professionalism among public officers affected compliance (de Boer and Telgen, 1998). 
Similarly, in China’s construction industry, a lack of professionalism affected compliance 
with regulatory frameworks Deng et al. (2014) and in Malaysia, reports showed a lack of 
professionalism affected public construction projects. In this example, public officers revealed 
Government prices to preferred contractors whilst selecting quotations in open tendering 
(Shu Hui et al., 2011). Such an attitude of accepting bribes and sharing fraudulent gains 
hampered confidentiality (Shu Hui et al., 2011). Noteworthy, the literature review revealed 
that some procurement officers demanded contractors’ adherence to contract specifications 
by upholding professional integrity and their ethical code. The act promoted compliance with 
their respective public procurement regulatory framework.
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SANCTIONS 
Ineffective punitive measures affect compliance in public procurement.This leads to 
Governments losing significant funds, especially in public road construction subsector (Agaba 
and Shipman, 2007; PPDA Authority, 2009). Enforcing sanctions in road construction 
subsector encourages staff to comply with regulatory frameworks and governance (Agaba and 
Shipman, 2007; Wirick, 2009). For example, in Ghana, imposing sanctions on procurement 
officers engaging in maverick buying, enhanced compliance with a Public Procurement Act 
(Peprah, 2015). Sanctions suggests negative incentives, including threats and punishments/
penalties imposed on violators of a particular regulatory framework. Sanctions make violators 
plot/scheme how they may prevent and conceal detection of their wrong doing (Zubcic 
and Sims, 2011). Bowen, Edwards and Cattell (2012) noted that an absence of sanctions in 
the construction industry affects compliance. The suggestion being that the complexity of 
construction projects exacerbated the problem. This notion is supported by reports showing 
that weak sanctions enforcement mechanisms have affected compliance with regulatory 
frameworks and hampering Government objectives (Okeahalam, 2004). Imposing legal 
sanctions on road construction teams to improve regulatory compliance should be applied 
cautiously (Gunningham and Kagan, 2005). Whilst Shu Hui et al. (2011) suggest enforcing 
strict penalties including cutting public officers’ salaries and confiscating their property could 
enhance compliance with the public procurement regulatory frameworks.
PERCEIVED INEFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The Ugandan Government has prioritized funding the road subsector as a vehicle for 
economic transformation (Ministry of Works and Transport, 2015). To achieve this, 
loopholes, e.g. unclear national construction standards within a regulatory framework may be 
manipulated for personal interest (PPDA Authority, 2008). A regulatory framework designed 
to facilitate procurement activities in an accountable and transparent manner to achieve value 
for money is required (Agaba and Shipman, 2007). This notion is supported by institutional 
theory that emphasises compliance with an efficient regulatory framework (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1988). Convincingly, a lack of compliance in the construction industry is attributed 
to perceived inefficiency of regulatory frameworks (Styhre, 2011). For example, in the 
Netherlands EU directives were flouted because they were perceived inefficient (Gelderman, 
Ghijsen and Brugman, 2006). Such inefficiencies exist in Uganda’s public procurement 
regulatory framework. For example, contract price variations are common in road construction 
projects beyond an allowable range of 20-30 % (PPDA Authority, 2003). Similarly, a lack of 
compliance is attributed to an inefficient public procurement regulatory framework in East 
Africa (Odhiambo and Kamau, 2003). These challenges affect compliance with the regulatory 
frameworks governing road construction projects. An inefficient public procurement regulatory 
framework could encourage unethical behaviour that cost taxpayer significant funds (Ntayi 
et al., 2010).
CONTRACTORS’ RESISTANCE TO NON-COMPLIANCE 
Implementing public road construction projects requires a team effort and compliance 
with governing regulatory framework is important (Scott, 2005). Contractor’s resistance 
refers to contractors rejecting bad decisions by public officers regarding implementation 
processes. Compliance in implementing public road construction projects is promoted if 
contractors act against deviant public officers (Gelderman, Ghijsen and Schoonen, 2010). 
Compliance within a Regulatory Framework in Implementing Public Road Construction Projects
Construction Economics and Building,  Vol. 18, No. 4, December 20185
This is because contractors can influence project outcome through their professional skills 
(Hemström, Gustavsson and Mahapatra, 2017). Institutional theory supports the notion that 
compliance is affected by resistance from different players with varying ambitions and means 
of accomplishing tasks (Kondra and Hinings, 1998). However, contractors’ resistance depends 
on their knowledge of the regulatory framework governing public road construction projects. 
Contractors use the knowledge to report deviant officers that compels them to comply with 
regulatory framework because they fear being exposed. Pachnou (2005) cautions contractors 
to balance between winning and losing cases due to inefficiencies in remedy mechanism. 
Contractors are unwilling to report public officers if the remedy enforcement mechanism that 
affects compliance with regulatory frameworksis weak.
MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM 
A lack of compliance was reported in the construction public sector that resulted in extra 
cost and wasted time in procurement (Lind and Brunes, 2014). Examples include; poor 
implementation plans, substandard work, a high contract price, variations and schedule 
overruns in the construction and engineering industry (Golden and Picci, 2006; Ramanathan, 
Narayanan and Idrus, 2012). Further, in international research these factors have been reported 
to account for annual loss of US$258.6 million (AU$ 351.696M) (Agaba and Shipman, 
2007). Interestingly, reports show that compliance with regulatory frameworks in public 
procurement is reducing despite efforts to enforce improvement strategies through capacity 
building (PPDA Authority, 2012). Since the PPDA Act 2003 was enacted, several reforms 
have taken place as a consequence of the current PPDA amendments 2014. These were 
aimed at strengthening the Act to achieve value for money (VFM). Despite this, a lack of 
compliance persists. For example, the Busega-Masaka (51Km) road project lost significant 
funds (with 52% contract price variations) and completion was delayed by three years (Uganda 
National Road Authority, 2014). Additional examples showing lack of compliance are Kanoni-
Ssembabule-Villa Maria (120KM) and Hima-Katunguru (58KM) road construction projects 
where UGX322 billion (AU$87M) is being investigated for procurement irregularities. The 
Ugandan parliament has ordered an investigation on 28 on-going road construction projects 
(New Vision, 2016). Whereas few studies attempted to address lack of compliance in public 
procurement, little is known about enforcing compliance in public road construction subsector. 
Hence, with evidence of anomalies facing public road project implementation, call for research 
to establish factors affecting compliance with public procurement regulatory framework 
governing public road construction projects (Eyaa and Oluka, 2011). 
From the literature review and identified problem, six hypotheses are developed:
H1. Familiarity with public procurement regulatory framework increase compliance with 
public procurement regulatory framework.
H2. Monitoring activities on public road construction projects increase compliance with 
public procurement regulatory framework
H3. Professionalism of staff in public road construction projects increase compliance with 
public procurement regulatory framework
H4. Sanctions on staff in public road construction projects increase compliance with public 
procurement regulatory framework
H5. Perceived inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework reduces compliance 
with public procurement regulatory framework.
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H6. Contractors’ resistance to non-compliance with public procurement regulatory framework 
by public officers increases compliance with public procurement regulatory framework.
RESEARCH MODEL
A two step-process was used in formulating the research model. From a traditional literature 
review, compliance factors were identified and grouped into four major categories, which were 
environmental, organizational, project and individual factors. A second step involved analyzing 
and interpretation that enabled merging/eliminating similar factors. This process resulted 
in six compliance factors that determined compliance with public procurement regulatory 
framework as reflected in Figure 1. Reducing factors helps in an in-depth understanding of 
study phenomenon as many factors are time consuming and waste resources (Collin, 2002). 
Respective measurement items were identified and presented in Table 1. These indicators were 
adopted from previous studies and modified to fit the current study.
Table 1 Factors that Affect Compliance and Measurement Indicators
Factors Measurement indicators
Familiarity
(Eyaa and Oluka, 2011; Gelderman, 
Ghijsen and Brugman, 2006; 
Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013).
F1. The regulatory framework governing 
public road construction projects is 
precisely written for easy interpretation.
F3. Only staff who are familiar 
with implementation of public road 
construction projects are used.
F13. Staff with appropriate academic 
qualification are employed on applicable 
road construction projects.
Monitoring activities
(Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013; Rokkan 
and Buvik, 2009).
M4. Frequent inspections checking on 
timely recording of project progress.
M13. Frequent inspections ensuring timely 
project completion.
M14. Frequent inspections to prevent 
damage.
M15. Frequent inspections to prevent 
theft.
Professionalism
(Basheka and Mugabira, 2008; Eyaa 
and Oluka, 2011).
PR3. Staff high professional integrity.
PR18. Professional judgement during 
decision making.
PR19. Practical experience in road 
construction.
PR20. Required expertise in road 
construction.
PR21. High level of confidentiality.
Sanctions
(Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013; Payan 
and McFarland, 2005).
S7.Penalties imposed on those found 
guilty without any warning.
S8. Sanctions are implemented in secret.
S9. Sanctions with negative consequences 
are imposed.
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Factors Measurement indicators
Perceived inefficiency 
(Gelderman, Ghijsen and Schoonen, 
2010).
PI1. Ban on negotiation between 
contractors and public officers during road 
construction.
PI2. Ban on contract extension beyond 
agreed schedule.
PI3. Ban on underperforming contractors.
Contractors’ resistance
(Gelderman, Ghijsen and Schoonen, 
2010; Gelderman, Ghijsen and 
Brugman, 2006).
CR1. Contractors’ readiness to act against 
bad decisions.
CR2. Contractors’ knowledge on public 
road procurement process.
Compliance
(Gelderman, Ghijsen and Brugman, 
2006; Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013; 
Payan and McFarland, 2005).
CP1. Proper authorization of road 
construction projects.
CP2. Timely delivery of road construction 
projects.
CP3. Timely recording of road construction 
transactions.
CP10. Achievable road construction project 
objective.
The final model illustrates the relationship between six compliance factors (Independent 
variables) and compliance with public procurement regulatory framework (Dependent 
variable) represented by H1-H6 as depicted in Fig1.
Figure 1 Validated model. (Source: Authors)
Research Method
A deductive research approach was adopted due to its ability in testing hypotheses for 
constructs relationships’ direction, strength and variance through statistical techniques 
(Saunders, 2012). This was enabled through linkages between seven study variables 
representing causal relationships (H1-H6).
RESEARCH DESIGN
A cross-sectional research design with a quantitative approach was adopted because it can link 
data to hypotheses, model development and generalizing results (Barratt and Kirwan, 2009). 
Table 1 continued
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Additionally, its statistical techniques are good for accuracy, validity, reliability, generalizability 
and objectivity compared to qualitative (Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013; Sekaran and Bougie, 
2010). A comprehensive literature review of peer-reviewed journals and public documents was 
performed via Scopus, Google Scholar, Science direct and Google search engines and seven 
study variables were established as depicted in Fig 1. A structured questionnaire covering 
these variables was developed with respective measurement indicators adopted and modified 
from previous studies. These indicators were anchored on a five-Likert scale ranging from 1 
(Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree).
A population of 1300 in five entities from Uganda was considered. Uganda was selected 
because of reports of procurement irregularities facing road subsector that is heavily donor 
funded. A sample of 299 was obtained following (Krejcie and Morgan, 1970). Proportionate 
stratified random sampling was used to select respondents from respective departments of 
participating entities. Majority of respondents hold a first degree and above (93.8%), in the 
position of officer/manager and higher (84.4%) and have work experience beyond two years. 
The questionnaires were physically delivered with the help of research assistants recruited. 
Follow-up reminders through telephone calls were made before collecting 194 completed 
questionnaires representing approximately 65% response rate. 
VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY
The questionnaire was piloted with selected procurement officers in New South Wales 
Australia for clarity and relevance. This enabled validating the questionnaire by rewording 
and deleting ambiguous statements. Through Smart-PLS3 software, PLS-algorithms with 
factor analysis was conducted to obtain measurement indicators. This software was considered 
because its techniques are robust in handling non-normal data and simultaneous analysis 
unlike other software. Composite reliability was used to test for internal consistence because it 
assumes more accurate parameter estimation than Cronbach alpha (Chin, 2010). Convergent 
validity was determined through Average Variance Extracted (AVE) (Hair et al., 2012a). 
Discriminatory validity was determined through a reliable Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio 
(HTMT) (Hair et al., 2017; Rasoolimanesh et al., 2017).
DATA CLEANING AND ANALYSIS
The analysis focused on research hypotheses within research objective. This was enabled by 
estimating Partial Least Square-Structural Equation Model (PLS-SEM) in Smart-PLS 
software. Data was captured in excel programme and imported into SPSS24 and Smart-PLS3 
for screening to ensure completeness and accuracy. Whereas PLS-SEM is flexible with less 
stringent constraints, some level of data screening was necessary before model estimation 
(Henseler, Ringle and Sinkovics, 2009). Screening enabled checking and handling reliability, 
validity, multi-collinearity, normality, outliers and missing values. This purification process was 
majorly concerned with obtaining final measurement indicators with high inter-correlation for 
internal consistency (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw, 2006).
Uni-dimensionality: Uni-dimensionality was handled by determining discriminant validity 
by assessing HTMT values to determine construct validity(Kline, 2015).
Collinearity: Extreme collinearity was solved by running PLS-algorithms and verifying 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF).
Outliers: Outliers was solved by performing descriptive analysis and converting extreme 
scores to a value equal to next most extreme score that is within three standard deviations of 
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the mean. The Z score was used with the condition: Z ≥ ±2.5 (i.e. Z ≥ -2.5, implies extreme 
low value and hence add 1 to that value, Z ≥ 2.5, implies high extreme value and hence 
subtract 1 from that value).
Missing data:Available case method was adopted to handle missing data by running 
frequencies for each questionnaire items. Two questionnaires with 84.8% total missing data 
were removed from analysis to prevent distorting relationship prediction (Hair et al., 2014). 
Hence, usable questionnaires were 192.
Normality test: Fairly normal distribution is recommended for PLS-SEM to produce strong 
significant results (Henseler, Ringle and Sinkovics, 2009). Normality test was performed based 
on Skewness and Kurtosis.
PATH COEFFICIENTS AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS
PLS-Algorithms was performed to identify the model and predict the relationships among 
study variables. This was achieved by evaluating path coefficients whereby values above 0.1 
indicate independent variables are well represented and model identified (Gefen, Straub 
and Boudreau, 2000; Hair et al., 2012a). While bootstrapping was run with 5000 bootstrap 
samples to determine prediction significance. This was based on to accept and reject stated 
hypotheses. Analysis converged at 11 interactions far below pre-set 300-stop criterion 
implying good convergence and prediction. Model predictive relevancy and fitting were 
respectively determined through the coefficient of determination and Standardized Root 
Mean Square Residual (SRMR) after running PLS-algorithms and bootstrapping (Ringle, 
Wende and Becker, 2015). 
Results
This section presents respective results of Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) based on 
research objective and hypotheses. It begins with preliminary analysis results for measurement 
model assessment, followed by structural model assessment through collinearity, path 
coefficient significance, coefficient of determination (R2) and model fit. All composite 
reliability coefficients are above 0.7 proving good internal consistence while indicator loadings 
are above 0.6 depicting sufficient construct representation (see Table 2 & 3). All AVE values 
are greater than 0.5 showing that the latent construct explains more than 50% variance of its 
measurement indicators representing sufficient convergent validity as presented in Table 2 
(Urbach and Ahlemann, 2010). While HTMT values are less than 0.8 demonstrating good 
discriminant validity as depicted in Table 4 (Hair et al., 2017). All VIF values are far below 5 
as depicted in Table 2 implying extreme collinearity was not a problem (Hair et al., 2012b). 
Skewness and kurtosis statistics for all study variables are respectively within acceptable 
limits of ±3 and ±5 exhibiting fairly normal distribution as depicted in Table 5 ( Jondeau and 
Rockinger, 2003). The preliminary results presented in Table 2-5 imply that measurement 
model is sufficient and suitable to conduct structural model assessment.
Table 2 Reliability test results
Variable Composite Reliability (ρc) AVE VIF
Familiarity 0.792 0.560 1.348
Monitoring activities 0.830 0.555 1.462
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Variable Composite Reliability (ρc) AVE VIF
Professionalism 0.838 0.509 1.602
Sanctions 0.798 0.576 1.434
perceived inefficiency 0.817 0.599 1.528
Contractors’ Resistance 0.802 0.560 1.273
Compliance 0.840 0.572
Table 3 Outer loadings
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CP1 0.895          
CP 10 0.727          
CP2 0.663          
CP3 0.719          
CR1   0.856        
CR2   0.779        
F1     0.746      
F13     0.675      
F3     0.818      
M13       0.597    
M14       0.858    
M15       0.820    
M4       0.675    
PI1         0.730  
PI2         0.845  
PI3         0.742  
PR 18           0.682
PR19           0.686
PR 20           0.714
PR 21           0.791
PR3           0.690
Table 2 continued
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Table 4 Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio
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Compliance            
Contractors’ 
resistance
0.378          
Familiarity 0.195 0.501        
Monitoring 0.180 0.460 0.524      
Perceived 
inefficiency
0.555 0.602 0.451 0.249    
Professionalism 0.140 0.518 0.650 0.691 0.340  
Sanctions 0.572 0.453 0,381 0.389 0.769 0.335
Table 5 Skewness and Kurtosis results
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N Valid 192 192 192 192 192 192 192
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean 3.5874 3.5592 3.5187 3.4544 2.9427 3.7161 3.2054
Std. 
Deviation
.53441 .56945 .44215 .52716 .98249 .82747 .69980
Table 3 continued
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Skewness -.345 -.545 -.063 .086 -.018 -.699 .069
Kurtosis -.333 .973 .277 -.328 -.331 .266 -.619
Table 6 R2 and SRMR
  Original Sample (O) P Values
Compliance (R2) 0.279 0.000
 SRMR 0.068 0.000
Discussion
This section discuss relationship between study variables showing accepted/rejected 
hypotheses, coefficient of determination and model fit.
FAMILIARITY AND COMPLIANCE WITH PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK
There is an insignificant relationship between familiarity with regulatory framework governing 
public road construction projects and compliance (α = 0.000, t = 0.001, p = 0.999) at 5% 
significance level. Implying that familiarity did not predict compliance and management 
should not prioritise increasing their staff familiarity with the procurement regulatory 
framework. Hence, familiarity does not increase compliance with public procurement 
regulatory framework and H1 is not supported. The findings contradict earlier studies that 
found that familiarity significantly predicted compliance in public procurement (Eyaa and 
Oluka, 2011). This may be a result of involving highly qualified staff since 93.8% are graduates 
with working experience of more than two years. Previous reports showed lack of familiarity as 
hampering compliance with Uganda National Roads Authority objectives (Uganda National 
Road Authority, 2014). Considerable efforts could have been made to rectify the situation 
that implies staff familiarity with regulatory framework governing road construction projects 
is no longer a challenge compared to the past reports from previous studies. Familiarity was 
measured by using staff who are familiar with project implementation and employing staff 
with appropriate academic qualification.
MONITORING ACTIVITIES AND COMPLIANCE WITH PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
There is an insignificant inverse relationship between monitoring activities and compliance  
(α = -0.046, t = 0.522, p = 0.601) at 5% significance level. This implies that monitoring 
activities did not predict compliance with public procurement regulatory framework. 
Table 5 continued
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Management should not prioritise monitoring public road construction projects aimed at 
increasing compliance. Monitoring activities do not increase compliance and H2 is not 
supported corresponding to (Rutherford, Buchholtz and Brown, 2007; Tabish and Jha, 
2015). However, these findings are contradictory to theories proposing effective monitoring 
mechanism (Kauppi and van Raaij, 2015). This is attributed to various monitoring agencies 
involved in road implementation. Despite inconsistencies between previous studies, the 
findings show that staff are aware of Government monitoring mechanism in place that compel 
them to comply impliedly. However, management should not ignoresignificant indicators 
measuring monitoring activities namely; frequent inspections for timely recording of project 
progress, timely project completion and proper storage methods.
PROFESSIONALISM OF STAFF AND COMPLIANCE WITH PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
There is an insignificant inverse relationship between professionalism of staff and compliance 
(α = -0.102, t = 1.250, p = 0.211) at 5% significance level. Implying that professionalism of 
staff does not predict compliance and H3 is not supported. This corresponds to earlier studies 
where professionalism was insignificant in enhancing compliance among public entities (Eyaa 
and Oluka, 2011). However, management should encourage high staff professional integrity, 
professional judgement during decision-making, high level of confidentiality, employing 
practically experienced road construction staff with required expertise since these were key 
indicators measuring professionalism. Professionalism is emphasized in organizational 
performance (DiMaggio and Powell, 2015). Current findings are consistent with previous 
studies implying that management has continuously encouraged professionalism in public 
sector that is adopted by road construction subsector. This is due to over 55% of staff are 
registered by various professional bodies. Furthermore, professionalism is well attained with 
current higher procurement qualifications offered by universities in Uganda and empowerment 
of professional bodies enforcing respective professional codes.
SANCTIONS AND COMPLIANCE WITH PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK
There is a significant positive relationship between sanctions on staff and compliance  
(α = 0.315, t = 3.540, p = 0.000) at 1% significance level. Implying that sanctioning staff on 
public road construction projects predicted compliance with public procurement regulatory 
framework. This requires management to continuously punish and apprehend staff found 
guilty during project implementation. Increasing penalties on road construction team 
are effective in achieving compliance. Hence, sanctions increase compliance with public 
procurement regulatory framework and H4 is significantly supported. This confirms earlier 
studies proposing the use of sanctions in achieving compliance (Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013; 
Scott, 2013; Wirick, 2009). The findings are in line with previous reports because sanctions 
create fears among road construction team when apprehended.  Managers can impose 
sanctions with negative consequences, penalize guilty staff without warning and imposing 
sanctions to enforce compliance.
PERCEIVED INEFFICIENCY AND COMPLIANCE WITH PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
There is an inverse significant relationship between perceived inefficiency and compliance  
(α = -0.253, t = 3.052, p = 0.002) at 1% significance level. Implying that perceived inefficiency 
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of public procurement regulatory framework reduces compliance with this regulatory 
framework. Hence, H5 is significantly supported. Banning negotiation between contractors 
and public officers during road construction, banning contract extension beyond agreed 
period and banning underperforming contractors are effective in achieving compliance 
during project implementation. These were key indicators measuring perceived inefficiency 
of public procurement regulatory framework. Management should enforce these indicators 
that define how well regulatory framework governing public road construction projects 
is efficient and effective. However, if these indicators are not emphasized, the regulatory 
framework will be perceived inefficient with loopholes for manipulation. The findings are 
aligned with institutional theory contending that efficient organizational norms determine 
compliance for organization’s performance (Greenwood and Hinings, 1988). However, they 
contradict earlier studies that found an insignificant relationship between the two factors 
using a sample from Netherlands municipalities (Gelderman, Ghijsen and Brugman, 2006). 
Despite this contradiction, current findings are supported by institutional theory implying that 
implementing public road construction projects requires an efficient and effective regulatory 
framework to achieve Government objectives.
CONTRACTORS’ RESISTANCE AND COMPLIANCE WITH PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
There is a significant positive relationship between contractors’ resistance and compliance 
(α = 0.135, t = 2.002, p = 0.045) at 5% significance level. Implying that contractors’ 
resistance to non-compliance predicted compliance with public procurement regulatory 
framework. Management should empower contractors’ by creating awareness to understand 
the consequences of not following the right regulatory framework governing public road 
construction projects. This can be achieved by increasing contractors’ knowledge on public 
road procurement process and encouraging them to act against deviant public officers as 
key indicators measuring contractors’ resistance to effectively achieve compliance. Hence, 
contractors’ resistance to non-compliance increases compliance with public procurement 
regulatory framework and H6 is significantly supported. Institutionally, different players can 
resist others with specific reasons for doing the right thing at their knowledge and experience 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). Contractors have the right to resist bad decisions from 
public officers since failing to meet project requirements may affect its implementation and 
in turn affect winning future contracts. The findings are contradicting Netherland’s study that 
found contractors’ resistance not influencing compliance in public procurement (Gelderman, 
Ghijsen and Schoonen, 2010; Gelderman, Ghijsen and Brugman, 2006). This contradiction 
could be attributed to the fact that contractors’ resistance is an emerging factor that needs 
persistent testing across sectors. Nevertheless, the current findings are encouraging since they 
are in line with institutional theory.
COEFFICIENT OF DETERMINATION (R2) AND MODEL FIT
ThePLS-algorithm and bootstrap results reveal that coefficient of determination for 
compliance with public procurement regulatory framework model’s explained variance is 
significantly good as depicted in Table 6 (R2 = 0.279, p < 0.001). This shows sufficient model 
predicative power (Gefen, Straub and Boudreau, 2000; Hair et al., 2012a). In addition, SRMR 
shows that the model is fitting well since it is within acceptable threshold of ≤ 0.08 see Table 6 
(SRMR = 0.068, p < 0.001) (Hu and Bentler, 1999; Kline, 2015). 
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Implication and Knowledge Contribution
The findings show that sanctions, perceived inefficiency and contractors’ resistance are 
significant factors determining compliance with public procurement regulatory framework. 
While familiarity, monitoring activities and professionalism are not predictors of compliance 
with a public procurement regulatory framework. These results are compared with the findings 
of Mwakibinga and Buvik (2013) where monitoring and sanctions were supported when 
applied separately, but when increasing monitoring was applied, the imposition of sanctions 
was reduced. Accordingly, this study contributes to existing construction management and 
public procurement studies generally and particularly in public road construction by showing 
that sanctions on staff, perceived inefficiency of public procurement regulatory framework and 
contractors’ resistance to non-compliance with public procurement regulatory framework are 
significant compliance factors in enhancing compliance with public procurement regulatory 
framework governing public road construction projects. Theories that underpin these factors, 
to achieve compliance are provided by (Greenwood and Hinings, 1988; Van Slyke, 2007). 
Eradicating inefficiencies within a regulatory framework and enforcing effective sanctions, 
empowering contractors to take actions against deviant public officers through effective and 
efficient mechanisms would enhance compliance in public road construction projects. Hence, 
increased quality paved road network and boosting economic development.
Conclusion
The study’s purpose was to establish factors affecting compliance within public procurement. 
A validated compliance model to guide management was established. The findings show that 
sanctions on staff, perceived inefficiency of regulatory framework and contractors’ resistance are 
significant factors that enhance compliance with a public procurement regulatory framework 
when implementing public road construction projects. Enforcing these factors effectively 
would save significant funds that Governments globally can use to increase paved road 
network and steer economic development. In addition, creating awareness and reconfiguring 
enforcement mechanisms and effective penalties would increase trepidation among staff. A 
potential outcome is a useful framework and attainment of Government goals. Sanctions 
including contract termination, suspension, confiscation of property and non-payments are 
recommended to enhance compliance and achieve value for money. Regular transfers and 
rotation of staff are encouraged to curb unethical behaviours (Obanda, 2010). This is an 
indirect sanctioning measure to eradicate collusion associated with over staying in one position 
or workstation. Additional punitive measures may include, but not be limited to; demotion, 
prison sentences, confiscation of property of those found guilty and introducing attractive 
rewarding schemes for performing staff (Shu Hui et al., 2011).
The Government should consider banning; negotiations during project implementation, 
extending contracts beyond agreed schedule and underperforming contractors. These policies 
would ensure a clear and efficient public procurement regulatory framework capable of 
meeting respective Government goals. Additionally, governing regulatory framework should 
be explicitly written in plain language for ease of interpretation. Furthermore, empowering 
contractors’ knowledge of public procurement regulatory framework and acting against bad 
decisions by public officers could control deviant officers during a project’s implementation. 
Despite these interesting findings, it is noted that the study focused on Uganda and these 
findings may be cautiously applied globally. Secondly, a cross-sectional research design based 
on a close ended questionnaire was adopted. This limited the scope of responses to a particular 
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time. Hence, a longitudinal study blended with interviews would be appropriate in the 
future. Scholars should investigate further and apply additional factors for a comprehensive 
compliance model. Finally, with limited studies using perceived inefficiency and contractors’ 
resistance factors, further empirical studies are encouraged to confirm their significance in 
different sectors worldwide. Irrespective of country’s jurisdiction, public construction projects 
are faced with similar procurement irregularities that affect project implementation (Kling, 
2008). Given these similarities and as a consequence of the pilot study using the Australian 
construction sector, the current study findings could be applied cautiously beyond Uganda’s 
road construction subsector.
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